Based on evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary process of the strategy choices of urban residents and transportation departments under uncertain environments was studied. Considering the random disturbances in the evolutionary process of both parties, Gaussian white noise was introduced to reflect the random disturbances affecting both the residents and the transportation department. A random evolutionary game model was constructed for urban residents and the transportation department under uncertain environments, and the stability of their strategy choices was analyzed. Through computer simulations, the impact of key factors on the strategy choices of the game participants was analyzed. The results show that random disturbances accelerate the evolutionary rate of urban residents and the transportation department. Reducing the green travel costs for urban residents and increasing subsidies for the transportation department can more effectively speed up the convergence of residents to the equilibrium strategy. Enhancing urban residents' awareness of green travel can effectively increase the proportion of residents choosing green travel methods. Reducing the promotion costs of the transportation department and improving its overall benefits can increase the proportion of the transportation department choosing an active promotion strategy. Although government penalties promote the transportation department's choice of active promotion strategies, excessively high penalties may reduce the department's initiative to adopt such strategies. Based on this, policy recommendations have been proposed to enhance urban residents' willingness to adopt green travel.