Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy

Xue-gang SHI , Dan GAO

Science Technology and Engineering ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1) : 365 -373.

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Science Technology and Engineering ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1) : 365-373 DOI: 10.12404/j.issn.1671-1815.2402162
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Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy
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Abstract

In order to improve the efficiency of air transportation, reduce transportation costs and carbon emissions, the evolutionary game method was adopted to explore the influencing factors of the cargo alliance between the government and airlines. The system dynamics model (SD) was used to conduct simulation experiments on the game evolution process. The results indicate that the strategic choices between airlines are influenced by investment costs and alliance benefits, while the government's strategic choices are influenced by factors such as the carbon emission penalty coefficient paid by airlines, carbon tax subsidy amounts, social benefits, and regulatory costs. In the long run, the government should establish a dynamic subsidy mechanism and increase the diversity of subsidies to enhance the innovation and core competitiveness of airlines.

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airline cargo alliance / government incentives / evolutionary game theory / system dynamics / carbon emission

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Xue-gang SHI, Dan GAO. Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy. Science Technology and Engineering, 2025, 25(1): 365-373 DOI:10.12404/j.issn.1671-1815.2402162

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