In order to identify the information security risks existing in the oil and gas smart pipeline system, the information physical security of the oil and gas smart pipeline system was comprehensively assessed and analyzed through the method based on systems-theoretic accident modeling and process (STAMP). First, the equipment, facilities, processes, and components involved in the oil and gas smart pipeline were systematically and comprehensively analyzed to assess their safety. Secondly, through the establishment of STAMP model, the feedback information and control actions between each level and component were analyzed in depth, and a clear control feedback loop was formed, highlighting the association and control relationship between components. On this basis, potential information risk factors were systematically identified, and possible system failure scenarios were deduced and constructed. Taking the oil and gas smart pipeline system of the first natural gas transmission station as an example, the study verified the feasibility and effectiveness of the STAMP-based model. The results show that the method not only intuitively describes the association and control relationship between components, but also comprehensively considers the information risk from the perspective of physical layer functional safety, especially highlighting the control elements PCS (process control systems) and the vulnerable operator stations. Compared with traditional methods, the method proposed in this study increases the identification rate of information physical security risk factors to more than 80%, which is an improvement of more than 40%, helps to avoid unnecessary redundant design of security measures, and improves the accuracy of security risk management and control.