碳税政策下航空货运联盟三方演化博弈

石学刚 ,  高丹

科学技术与工程 ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1) :365-373

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科学技术与工程 ›› 2025, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1) :365-373 DOI: 10.12404/j.issn.1671-1815.2402162
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碳税政策下航空货运联盟三方演化博弈

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Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy

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摘要

为提升航空运输效率,减少运输成本和碳排放量等问题,采用演化博弈方法探讨政府和航司间货运联盟的影响因素,利用系统动力学模型(systematic dynamics, SD)对博弈演化过程进行仿真实验。结果表明,航司间的策略选择受投资成本、联盟收益的影响,政府的策略选择受航司交纳的碳排放惩罚系数、碳税补贴额度、社会收益及监管成本等因素的影响。从长远来看,政府应该建立动态的补贴机制和增加补贴的多样性,提高航司的创新性和核心竞争力。

Abstract

In order to improve the efficiency of air transportation, reduce transportation costs and carbon emissions, the evolutionary game method was adopted to explore the influencing factors of the cargo alliance between the government and airlines. The system dynamics model (SD) was used to conduct simulation experiments on the game evolution process. The results indicate that the strategic choices between airlines are influenced by investment costs and alliance benefits, while the government's strategic choices are influenced by factors such as the carbon emission penalty coefficient paid by airlines, carbon tax subsidy amounts, social benefits, and regulatory costs. In the long run, the government should establish a dynamic subsidy mechanism and increase the diversity of subsidies to enhance the innovation and core competitiveness of airlines.

关键词

航空公司货运联盟 / 政府激励 / 演化博弈 / 系统动力学 / 碳排放

Key words

airline cargo alliance / government incentives / evolutionary game theory / system dynamics / carbon emission

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石学刚, 高丹. 碳税政策下航空货运联盟三方演化博弈[J]. 科学技术与工程, 2025, 25(1): 365-373 DOI:10.12404/j.issn.1671-1815.2402162
SHI Xue-gang, GAO Dan. Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy[J]. Science Technology and Engineering, 2025, 25(1): 365-373 DOI:10.12404/j.issn.1671-1815.2402162

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基金资助

国家社科基金后期资助项目(23FJYB042)

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