公铁联运模式下斯塔伯格博弈机理与综合均衡策略研究
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兰州交通大学交通运输学院

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U15

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甘肃省自然科学基金重点项目(24JRRA223)


Stackelberg Game Mechanism and Integrated Equilibrium Strategy in Road–Rail Intermodal Transport
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Traffic and Transportation College,Lanzhou Jiaotong University

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    摘要:

    当前公铁联运系统普遍存在供需匹配失衡、响应滞后问题。现有研究多局限于供给侧网络与资源优化,对需求侧货主策略性响应行为关注不足,难以刻画市场环境下供需主体之间的动态博弈关系。为揭示利益主体策略互动规律,本文从供需双侧视角出发,考量集装箱运输技术特征与货物分类异质性,构建货主与公铁联运运营方的双主从Stackelberg博弈模型。设定不同权力配置情景,分别建立“运营方主导”与“货主主导”两种博弈模式,并提出兼容双向博弈特征的综合均衡分析方法。模型求解中,利用KKT条件将下层优化问题转化为约束条件,通过Big-M法线性化互补松弛条件,将双层优化问题转化为单层MILP模型,求解得到不同主导权下的均衡策略。以新亚欧大陆桥国内段沿线鲁苏豫陕四省14个城市构建的公铁联运走廊为算例,求解结果表明,综合均衡解相较于单一公路运输的高碳排放状态及单一主从模式,不仅能降低碳排放量,还能实现供需双方收益的优化提升,可有效缓解“环保与效率”的矛盾,为政府引导货源转移、制定差异化运价政策提供理论参考。

    Abstract:

    At present, the road-rail intermodal transport system generally exhibits imbalances between supply and demand and delayed response. Existing studies mainly focus on supply-side network and resource optimization, while insufficient attention is paid to the strategic response behavior of shippers on the demand side. As a result, the dynamic game relationship between supply and demand entities in a market environment is difficult to capture. To reveal the interaction mechanism among stakeholders, a dual-perspective framework from both supply and demand sides is adopted. The technical characteristics of container transportation and the heterogeneity of cargo classification are considered. A bi-level Stackelberg game model between shippers and intermodal operators is constructed. Different power structure scenarios are defined. Two game modes, namely operator-led and shipper-led, are established. A comprehensive equilibrium analysis method compatible with bidirectional game characteristics is proposed. In the solution process, the lower-level optimization problem was transformed into constraints using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The complementary slackness conditions were linearized by the Big-M method. The bi-level optimization problem was then converted into a single-level mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model. The equilibrium strategies under different dominance structures were obtained. A case study was conducted based on an intermodal transport corridor consisting of 14 cities across Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, and Shaanxi provinces along the domestic section of the New Eurasian Continental Bridge. The results show that, compared with the high carbon emission level of single road transport and single leader-follower modes, the comprehensive equilibrium solution reduces carbon emissions and improves the benefits of both supply and demand sides. The contradiction between environmental protection and efficiency is effectively alleviated. The findings provide theoretical support for government policies on freight shifting and differentiated pricing strategies.

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杨菊花,赵志豪,田志强. 公铁联运模式下斯塔伯格博弈机理与综合均衡策略研究[J]. 科学技术与工程, , ():

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  • 收稿日期:2026-03-23
  • 最后修改日期:2026-06-03
  • 录用日期:2026-07-27
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