碳税政策下航空货运联盟三方演化博弈
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

中图法分类号:U125

基金项目:

国家社科基金后期资助项目(23FJYB042)


Analysis of the Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    为提升航空运输效率,减少运输成本和碳排放量等问题,采用演化博弈方法探讨政府和航司间货运联盟的影响因素,利用系统动力学模型(systematic dynamics,SD)对博弈演化过程进行仿真实验。结果表明,航司间的策略选择受投资成本、联盟收益的影响,政府的策略选择受航司交纳的碳排放惩罚系数、碳税补贴额度、社会收益及监管成本等因素的影响。从长远来看,政府应该建立动态的补贴机制和增加补贴的多样性,提高航司的创新性和核心竞争力。

    Abstract:

    In order to improve the efficiency of air transportation, reduce transportation costs and carbon emissions, the evolutionary game method is adopted to explore the influencing factors of the cargo alliance between the government and airlines. The system dynamics model (SD) is used to conduct simulation experiments on the game evolution process. The results indicate that the strategic choices between airlines are influenced by investment costs and alliance benefits, while the government's strategic choices are influenced by factors such as the carbon emission penalty coefficient paid by airlines, carbon tax subsidy amounts, social benefits, and regulatory costs. In the long run, the government should establish a dynamic subsidy mechanism and increase the diversity of subsidies to enhance the innovation and core competitiveness of airlines.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

石学刚,高丹. 碳税政策下航空货运联盟三方演化博弈[J]. 科学技术与工程, 2025, 25(1): 365-373.
Shi Xuegang, Gao Dan. Analysis of the Tripartite Evolution Game of Air Cargo Alliance under Carbon Tax Policy[J]. Science Technology and Engineering,2025,25(1):365-373.

复制
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:2024-03-26
  • 最后修改日期:2024-11-05
  • 录用日期:2024-05-02
  • 在线发布日期: 2025-01-13
  • 出版日期:
×
亟待确认版面费归属稿件,敬请作者关注